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Abstract
Recent attacks exploiting errors in smart contract code had
devastating consequences thereby questioning the benefits of
this technology. It is currently highly challenging to fix errors
and deploy a patched contract in time. Instant patching is
especially important since smart contracts are always online
due to the distributed nature of blockchain systems. They also
manage considerable amounts of assets, which are at risk and
often beyond recovery after an attack. Existing solutions to
upgrade smart contracts depend on manual and error-prone
processes. This paper presents a framework, called EVM-
PATCH, to instantly and automatically patch faulty smart con-
tracts. EVMPATCH features a bytecode rewriting engine for
the popular Ethereum blockchain, and transparently/automat-
ically rewrites common off-the-shelf contracts to upgradable
contracts. The proof-of-concept implementation of EVM-
PATCH automatically hardens smart contracts that are vul-
nerable to integer over/underflows and access control errors,
but can be easily extended to cover more bug classes. Our
extensive evaluation on 14,000 real-world (vulnerable) con-
tracts demonstrate that our approach successfully blocks at-
tack transactions launched on these contracts, while keeping
the intended functionality of the contract intact. We perform
a study with experienced software developers, showing that
EVMPATCH is practical, and reduces the time for converting
a given Solidity smart contract to an upgradable contract by
97.6 %, while ensuring functional equivalence to the original
contract.
1 Introduction
Smart contracts are used in modern blockchain systems to
allow nearly arbitrary (Turing-complete) business logic to
be implemented. They enable autonomous management of
cryptocurrency or tokens and have the potential to revolution-
ize many business applications by removing the need for a
trusted (potentially malicious) third party, e.g., in applications
for payments, insurances, crowd funding, or supply chains.
Due to their ease of use and the high monetary value (cryp-
tocurrency) some of these contracts hold, smart contracts have
become an appealing target for attacks. Programming errors
in smart contract code can have devastating consequences as
an attacker can exploit these bugs to steal cryptocurrency or
tokens.
Recently, the blockchain community has witnessed several
incidents due smart contract errors [7, 39]. One especially
infamous incident is the “TheDAO” reentrancy attack, which
resulted in a loss of over 50 million US Dollars worth of
Ether [31]. This led to a highly debated hard-fork of the
Ethereum blockchain. Several proposals demonstrated how
to defend against reentrancy vulnerabilities either by means
of offline analysis at development time or by performing run-
time validation [16, 23, 32, 42]. Another infamous incident is
the parity wallet attack [39]. In this case, an attacker moved
a smart contract into a state, where the currency held by the
contract could not be accessed anymore. This resulted in a
total of about 500,000 Ether to be stuck in smart contracts due
to an access control error [38]. Automatic detection of such
access control vulnerabilities has been previously studied in
the context of automated exploit generation [20, 28]. Further,
integer overflow bugs constitute a major vulnerability class
in smart contracts. Such bugs occur when the result of an
arithmetic operation has a longer width than the integer type
can hold [34]. According to a study by Torres et al. [13]
more than 42,000 contracts suffer from an integer bug. They
especially affect so-called ERC-20 Token contracts, which are
leveraged in Ethereum to create subcurrencies. Interestingly,
several of the disclosed vulnerabilities were actually exploited
leading to substantial token and ether losses.
These attacks have fueled interest in the community to
enhance the security of smart contracts. In this respect, a num-
ber of solutions ranging from devising better development
environments to using safer programming languages, formal
verification, symbolic execution, and dynamic runtime anal-
ysis have been proposed in the last few years [19, 23, 32].
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We point out that all these solutions only aim to prove the
correctness or absence of a certain type of vulnerability [19,
23, 42] and as such cannot be used to protect already de-
ployed (legacy) contracts. Although some contracts integrate
upgrade mechanisms (see § 2), once a particular contract has
been flagged as vulnerable, it is unclear how to automatically
patch it and test the effectiveness of the patched contract.
Even though manually patching contracts on the source-code
level seems plausible, the patch may unexpectedly break com-
patibility and make the upgraded contracts unusable. For
example, given the special storage layout design of Ethereum,
the delegatecall-proxy pattern requires developers to ensure
that the patched version of the contract is compatible with
the previously deployed version. Even small changes like
changing the ordering of variables in the source code can
break this compatibility. This additionally poses the challenge
that developers must adhere to strict coding standards [46]
and have to use the same exact compiler version. As a result,
patching smart contract errors is currently a time-consuming,
cumbersome, and error-prone process. For instance, while
patching the Parity multisig wallet contract, a vulnerability
was introduced. An attacker was able to become the owner
of the newly deployed library contract. This allowed the at-
tacker to destroy the contract and break all contracts that
depend on the multisig wallet library contract. As a result, a
considerable amount of Ether is now locked in those broken
contracts [38]. On top of that, patching smart contract bugs
is highly time-critical. In contrast to errors discovered in PC
or mobile software, smart contract errors are unique from an
attacker’s point of view as (1) smart contracts are always
online on the blockchain, (2) they usually hold a significant
amount of assets, and (3) an attacker does not need to con-
sider other environmental variables (e.g., software and library
version, network traffic analysis, spam or phishing mails to
trigger the exploit through a user action).
Contributions. In this paper, we address the problem of auto-
mated and timely patching of smart contracts to aid developers
to instantly take action on reported smart contract errors. We
introduce a novel patching framework (in § 3) that features
a bytecode-rewriter for Ethereum smart contracts, is inde-
pendent of the source programming language and works on
unmodified contract code. Our framework, dubbed EVM-
PATCH, utilizes the bytecode-rewriting engine to ensure that
patches are minimally intrusive and that the newly patched
contract is compatible with the original contract. In particu-
lar, our framework automatically replays transactions on the
patched contract to
1. test the functional correctness of the patched contract
with respect to previous transactions pertaining to the
contract,
2. identify potential attacks, i.e., developers can determine
whether their vulnerable contract has been attacked in
the past.
EVMPATCH uses a best effort approach to ensure the in-
troduced patch does not break functionality by testing with
previously issued transactions to the contract and optionally
also developer provided unit tests. While such a differential
testing approach cannot provide a formal proof on the cor-
rectness of the patched contract, it works without requiring
a formal specification. Our experiments (see § 5.2.1) show
that this approach is sufficient in practice to identify broken
patches.
By applying patches on the bytecode level, EVMPATCH
is independent of the used programming language/compiler
and compiler version. That is, EVMPATCH supports any off-
the-shelf Ethereum smart contract code. We employ bytecode
writing to ensure minimally intrusive patches, that are com-
patible by design with the contract’s storage layout, We argue
that source-level patching is not easily usable in an automated
patching process that we propose. However, as for any ap-
proach working on either the binary or bytecode-level, we
had to tackle several technical challenges (§ 4). Furthermore,
EVMPATCH automatically converts the original contract to
use the delegatecall-proxy pattern. As such, EVMPATCH is
able to automatically deploy newly patched contracts in a fully
automated way without requiring any developer intervention.
While in principle EVMPATCH can support patching of
different classes of vulnerabilities (see § 4.5), our proof-of-
concept implementation targets the two major classes of
access control and integer overflow (§ 5) bugs. The latter
have been repeatedly exploited in high-value ERC-20 con-
tracts [30], whereas the former has been abused in the Parity
wallet attack [39].
To evaluate EVMPATCH in terms of performance, effec-
tiveness, and functional correctness, we apply EVMPATCH to
14,000 real-world vulnerable contracts. To this end, we used
the patch testing component of the EVMPATCH framework to
re-play all existing transactions to the original contract on the
patched contract. This allows us to provide in-depth investiga-
tion of several actively exploited smart contracts, e.g., token
burning and history of attack transactions (before and after
public disclosure). For a number of contracts we investigated
in our evaluation, we found that EVMPATCH would have
blocked several attacks that happened after public disclosure
of the vulnerability. This shows that even though those con-
tracts were officially deprecated, they were still used by legit-
imate users and exploited by malicious actors. As such, there
is an immediate need for tooling, as provided by EVMPATCH,
which allows the developers of smart contracts to efficiently
patch their contracts. Our evaluation also covers important
practical aspects such as gas and performance overhead (i.e.,
the costs for executing transactions in Ethereum). The gas
overhead for all our patched contracts was below 0.01 US$
per transaction and the performance overhead negligible.
To assess the usefulness of EVMPATCH, we conducted a
sophisticated developer study1 that focuses on comparing the
1See github.com/uni-due-syssec/evmpatch-developer-study for details
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usability of patching and deploying an upgradable contract
with and without EVMPATCH (§ 5.3). Our study reveals that
developers required 62.5 min (median) to manually (without
EVMPATCH) convert a simple smart contract, which imple-
ments common Wallet functionality in about 80 lines of code,
into an upgradable smart contract. In spite of this consid-
erable time, none of them performed a correct conversion,
leading to broken and potentially vulnerable contracts. As
such, this time measurements must be seen as a lower bound,
as correctly converting a more complex contract will take
even more time. In contrast, the same task was performed
by the developers using EVMPATCH in 1.5 min (median)—a
reduction by 97.6 %—while producing a correct upgradable
contract.
2 Background
In this section, we provide background information on the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), binary rewriting, and some
common contract upgrade strategies.
EVM & Smart Contracts: At the core of the Ethereum
blockchain system lies a custom virtual machine, dubbed
Etherum Virtual Machine (EVM), which executes Ethereum
smart contracts. EVM consists of a simple stack-based virtual
machine with a custom instruction format. Every instruction
is represented as a one-byte opcode. Arguments are passed
on the data stack. The only exception are the push instruc-
tions, which are used to push constants onto the stack. These
constants are encoded directly into the instruction bytes. Fur-
thermore, the EVM follows the Harvard architecture model
and separates code and data into different address spaces. In
fact, the EVM features different address spaces for different
purposes: the code address space, which contains a smart con-
tract’s code and is considered immutable, the storage address
space for storing global state, and the memory address space
for temporary data.
In the Ethereum network, a smart contract must be executed
by every miner and every full node in the network to com-
pute and verify the state before and after a block. Ethereum
features a mechanism to limit the execution time per smart
contract and reward miners for executing smart contracts: the
so-called gas. Every EVM instruction requires a certain gas
budget to execute. The transaction sender selects the price per
gas unit in Ether and when a transaction is included into a
block the corresponding Ether is transferred to the miner as a
reward. Minimizing the gas required for executing a contract
is important as it indirectly minimizes the cost of operating a
smart contract in Ethereum.
Smart contracts are developed in an object-oriented fashion,
i.e., every smart contract has a defined interface of functions:
the contract’s ABI (Application Binary Interface). Whenever
a smart contract calls another smart contract, it utilizes one of
the call instructions, such as CALL or STATICCALL. The called
contract will then process the provided input and update its
own state accordingly. A contract cannot directly access the
state (i.e., the storage area) of other contracts and must always
use function calls according to the ABI to retrieve any data
from another contract.
In contrast to the regular CALL instruction, the
DELEGATECALL instruction will execute the called con-
tract’s code in the context of the caller contract. This
instruction was introduced to implement library contracts,
i.e., common functionality can be deployed once to the
blockchain and multiple contracts can rely on one library
contract. This means that the callee, i.e., the library contract,
has full access to the state (the storage) and the Ether funds of
the caller. As such, a contract that utilizes a DELEGATECALL
instruction must fully trust the callee.
Binary Rewriting: Binary rewriting is a well-known tech-
nique to instrument programs after compilation. Binary rewrit-
ing has also been applied to retrofit security hardening tech-
niques such as control-flow integrity, to compiled binaries [8],
but also to dynamically apply security patches to running pro-
grams [29]. For binary rewriting on traditional architectures
two flavors of approaches have been developed: static and
dynamic rewriting.
Dynamic approaches [22] rewrite code on-the-fly, i.e.,
while the code is executing. This avoids imprecise static anal-
ysis on large binaries. However, dynamic binary rewriting
requires an intermediate layer, which analyzes and rewrites
code at runtime. Since the EVM does not support dynamic
code generation or modification, it is not possible to apply this
approach efficiently in Ethereum. In contrast, static binary
rewriting [5, 21] is applicable to Ethereum as it works com-
pletely offline. It relies on static analysis to recover enough
program information to accurately rewrite the code.
Contract Upgrade Strategies: Ethereum treats the code of
smart contracts as immutable once they are deployed on the
blockchain2. To remedy this, the community came up with
strategies for deploying upgraded smart contracts [11, 41, 45].
The most naive approach is to deploy the patched contract at a
new address and migrate the state of the original contract to it.
However, state migration is specific to the contract and must
be manually implemented by the developers of the contract.
It requires the contract developers to have access to all the
internal state of the old contract, and a procedure in the new
contract to accept state transfers. To avoid state migration,
developers can also use a separate contract as a data storage
contract, which is sometimes referred to as the eternal storage
pattern [10, 45]. However, this adds additional gas overhead
since every time the logic contract needs to access data it must
perform a costly external call into the data storage contract.
A more common strategy is to write contracts with the
proxy-pattern, with the most favorable version being the
delegatecall-proxy pattern. Here, one smart contract is split
into two different contracts, one for the code and one for
2Except for the selfdestruction mechanism to kill a smart contract.
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data storage: i) an immutable proxy contract, which holds
all funds and all internal state, but does not implement any
business logic; ii) a logic contract, which is completely state-
less and implements all of the actual business logic, i.e., this
contract contains the actual code that governs the actions of
the contract. The proxy contract is the entry point of all user
transactions. It has immutable code and its address remains
constant over the lifetime of the contract. The logic contract
implements the rules, which govern the behavior of the smart
contract. The proxy contract forwards all function calls to
the registered logic contract using the DELEGATECALL instruc-
tion. This instruction is used to give the logic contract access
to all internal state and funds stored in the proxy contract.
To upgrade the contract, a new logic contract is deployed
and its address is updated in the proxy contract. The proxy
contract then forwards all future transactions to the patched
logic contract. As a result, deploying upgraded contracts does
not require any data migration, as all data is stored in the
immutable proxy contract. Moreover, the upgrading process
is also transparent to users, as the contract address remains
the same. Although existing blockchain platforms do not pro-
vide mechanisms to upgrade smart contracts, the usage of
this proxy pattern allows EVMPATCH to quickly upgrade a
contract with negligible costs (in terms of gas consumption).
3 Design of EVMPatch
In this section, we introduce the design of our automated
patching framework to timely patch and harden smart con-
tracts. Our framework operates on unmodified smart con-
tracts and is independent of the source code programming
language, as it does not require source code. At its core, our
framework utilizes a bytecode rewriter to apply minimally
intrusive patches to EVM smart contracts. Combined with a
proxy-based upgradable smart contract, this bytecode rewrit-
ing approach allows the developer to automatically introduce
patches and deploy them on the blockchain. One major ad-
vantage of this approach is that when new attack types are
discovered or bug finding tools improve, the contract can
be automatically re-checked, patched, and re-deployed in a
short amount of time and with minimal developer intervention.
EVMPATCH is typically executed on a developer’s machine
and is continuously running new and updated vulnerability
detection tools. This can also include dynamic analysis tools,
which analyze transactions that are not yet included in a block,
but already available to the Ethereum network. Whenever one
of the analysis tools discovers a new vulnerability, EVM-
PATCH automatically patches the contract, tests the patched
contract and deploys it.
3.1 Design Choices
The proxy-pattern makes it possible to easily deploy a patched
smart contract in Ethereum. However, it neither generates a
patched version nor features functional tests on the patched
contract. EVMPATCH fills this gap by providing a compre-
hensive framework and toolchain to automatically and timely
patch and test the effectiveness of the generated patch.
As shown in Table 1, there are two possible strategies for
automatically generating a patch in Ethereum: static rewrit-
ing of source or EVM bytecode. At first glance, source-code
patching seems to be the option of choice as developers have
access to source code, they are able to inspect the source code
changes, and can even do adjustments if the automated ap-
proach introduces undesired changes. However, in Ethereum,
there is one major challenge when applying source code
rewriting: one needs to carefully preserve the storage lay-
out. Otherwise, the patched contract will corrupt its memory
and fail or (worse) introduce dangerous bugs. Namely, some
changes in the source code can break the contract compati-
bility, even though the changes do not break the logic of the
contract.
To put things into context, statically-sized variables are
laid out contiguously in storage starting from address 0; and
contiguous variables with size less than 32 B can be packed
into a single 32 B storage slot [9]. As a result, any changes
to re-order, add, or remove variables in the source-code may
look harmless, but on the memory level, such changes will
lead to mapping of variables to wrong and unexpected storage
addresses. In other words, changes in variable declaration
corrupt the internal state of the contract, as the legacy contract
and the patched contract have different storage layouts.
In contrast, bytecode rewriting does not suffer from this
deficiency as many bug classes only require changes on the
level of EVM instructions (see §5) avoiding any error-prone
storage-layout changes. Another reason to opt for bytecode
rewriting are existing smart contract vulnerability detection
tools. As of now, the majority of them operate on the EVM
level [13, 20, 23, 24, 32] and report their findings on the EVM
level. A bytecode rewriting approach can exploit the reports
of these analysis tools to directly generate an EVM bytecode-
based patch. Finally, if source-code rewriting is utilized, the
developer has limited possibilities to perform thorough test-
ing on the effectiveness of the patched contract. In particular,
checking the patched contract against old transactions (includ-
Table 1: Comparison of rewriting strategies in Ethereum
Source Rewriting Bytecode Rewriting
Corrupts storage-layout Preserves storage layout
Checking modifications by hu-
man analyst feasible
Human analysis of bytecode
changes challenging
Limited tool support for vul-
nerability analysis
Easy integration of vulnerabil-
ity analysis tools
Patch testing based on prior
transactions challenging
Easy patch testing with prior
transactions
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Figure 1: Architecture of EVMPATCH
ing transactions that encapsulate attacks) are more feasible
on bytecode level. That is, transaction testing naturally would
still require analysis on the bytecode level to reverse-engineer
the attack transactions and how they fail against the patched
contract. Bytecode-rewriting allows developers to directly
match the rewritten bytecode instructions to the attack trans-
actions making forensic analysis feasible. Given all these
reasons, we decided to opt for bytecode rewriting.
3.2 Framework Design
Our framework depicted in Figure 1 consists of the follow-
ing major components: (1) the vulnerability detection engine
consisting of automatic analysis tools and public vulnerabil-
ity disclosures, (2) bytecode rewriter to apply the patch to
the contract, (3) the patch testing mechanism to validate the
patch on previous transactions, and (4) the contract deploy-
ment component to upload the patched version of the contract.
At first, the vulnerability detection engine identifies the loca-
tion and type of the vulnerability. This information is then
passed to the bytecode rewriter, which patches the contract
according to previously defined patch templates. The patched
contract is thereafter forwarded to the patch tester, which re-
plays all past transactions to the contract. That said, we do
not only patch the contract, but we allow the developer to
retrieve a list of transactions that exhibit a different behav-
ior and outcome between the original and patched contract.
These transactions serve as an indicator for potential attacks
on the original contract. If the list is empty, our framework
automatically deploys the patched contract instantly on the
Ethereum blockchain. Next, we will provide a more detailed
description of the four major components of our design.
Vulnerability Detection. Before being able to apply patches,
our framework needs to identify and detect vulnerabilities.
To do this, our framework leverages existing vulnerability
detection tools such as [13, 16, 20, 23, 28, 32, 42]. For vulner-
abilities that are not detected by any existing tool, we require
that a developer or a security consultant creates a vulnerability
report. In our system, the vulnerability detection component
is responsible to identify the exact address of the instruction,
where the vulnerability is located, and the type of vulnerabil-
ity. This information is then passed to the bytecode rewriter,
which patches the contract accordingly.
Bytecode Rewriter. In general, static binary rewriting tech-
niques are well suited for applying patches in Ethereum since
smart contracts have comparably small code size: typically
in the range of about 10 KiB. Furthermore, EVM smart con-
tracts are always statically linked to all library code. It is not
possible for a contract to dynamically introduce new code
into the code address space. This makes the reliance on bi-
nary rewriting techniques simpler compared to traditional
architectures, where dynamically linked libraries are loaded
at runtime. However, some smart contracts still utilize a con-
cept similar to dynamically linked libraries: dedicated EVM
call instructions allow a contract to switch to a different code
address space. We tackle this peculiarity by applying our
bytecode rewriter to both the contract itself and the library
contract.
The stack-based architecture of the EVM requires special
attention when implementing a patch: all address-based ref-
erences to any code or data in the code address space of the
smart contract must be either preserved or updated when new
code is inserted into the code address space. Such references
cannot be easily recovered from the bytecode. To tackle this
challenge, EVMPATCH utilizes a trampoline-based approach
for adding new EVM instructions into empty code areas. The
implementation details will be described in § 4.
To implement a patch, the bytecode rewriter processes the
bytecode of the vulnerable contract as well as the vulner-
ability report. The rewriting is based on a so-called patch
template which is selected according to the vulnerability type
and adjusted to work with the given contract.
Patch Templates. In EVMPATCH, we utilize a template-
based patching approach: for every supported class of vul-
nerabilities, a patch-template is integrated into EVMPATCH.
This patch template is automatically adapted to the contract
that is being patched. We create generic patch templates such
that they can be easily applied to all contracts. EVMPATCH
automatically adapts the patch template to the contract at
hand by replacing contract-specific constants (i.e., code ad-
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dresses, function identifier, storage addresses). Patch tem-
plates for common vulnerabilities, such as integer overflows,
are shipped as part of EVMPATCH, and a typical user of
EVMPATCH will never interact with the patch templates.
However, optionally, a smart contract developer can also in-
spect or adapt existing patch templates or even create ad-
ditional patch templates for vulnerabilities that are not yet
supported by EVMPATCH.
Patch Tester. As smart contracts directly handle assets (such
as Ether), it is critical that any patching process does not im-
pede the actual functionality of a contract. As such, any patch
must be tested thoroughly. To address this issue, we introduce
a patch testing mechanism which is based (1) on the trans-
action history recorded on the blockchain and (2) optional
developer supplied unit tests. At this point, we exploit the
fact that any blockchain system records all previous execu-
tions of a smart contract, i.e., transactions in Ethereum. In our
case, the patch tester re-executes all existing transactions and
optionally any available unit test and verifies that all transac-
tions of the old legacy and the newly patched contract behave
consistently. The patch tester detects any behavioral discrep-
ancy between the old legacy and the newly patched contract
and reports a list of transactions with differing behavior to
the developer. That said, as a by-product, our patch testing
mechanism can be used as a forensic attack detection tool.
Namely, while executing the patching process, the developer
will also be notified of any prior attacks that abuse any of the
patched vulnerabilities and can then act accordingly. In case
both versions of the contract behave the same way, the patched
contract can be automatically deployed. Otherwise, the de-
veloper must investigate the list of suspicious transactions
and thereafter invoke the contract deployment component to
upload the patched contract. The list of suspicious transac-
tions may not only serve as an indicator of potential attacks,
but may reveal that the patched contract is not functionally
correct, i.e., the patched contract shows a different behavior
on benign transaction. In § 5, we provide a thorough investi-
gation on real-world, vulnerable contracts to demonstrate that
EVMPATCH successfully applies patches without breaking
the original functionality of the contract.
Contract Deployment. As discussed in § 2, the delegatecall-
proxy based upgrade scheme is the option of choice to enable
instant contract patching. Thus, EVMPATCH integrates this
deployment approach utilizing a proxy contract as the primary
entry point for all transactions with a constant address. Before
the first deployment, EVMPATCH transforms the original
unmodified contract code to utilize the delegatecall-proxy
pattern. This is done by deploying a proxy contract, which is
immutable and assumed to be implemented correctly3. The
original bytecode is then converted to a logic contract using
the bytecode rewriter with only minor changes to the original
code. The logic contract is then deployed alongside the proxy
3EVMPATCH comes with a well audited default proxy contract that is
only 80 lines of Solidity code.
contract.
Patch Deployment. Finally, when the contract is patched and
after the patch is tested by the patch tester component, EVM-
PATCH can deploy the newly patched contract. Our upgrade
scheme deploys the newly patched contract code to a new
address and issues a dedicated transaction to the previously
deployed proxy contract, which switches the address of the
logic contract from the old vulnerable version to the newly
patched version. Any further transactions are now handled by
the patched logic contract.
Human Intervention. EVMPATCH is designed to be fully
automated. However, there are a few scenarios, where de-
veloper intervention is needed if (1) the vulnerability report
relates to a bug class that is not yet supported by EVMPATCH,
or (2) the patch tester reports at least one transaction that fails
due to the newly introduced patch and the failing transaction
is not a known attack transaction, (3) the patch tester reports
that at least one known attack transaction is not prevented by
the newly introduced patch.
If a bug class is not supported, EVMPATCH informs the
developer about the unsupported vulnerability class. Since
EVMPATCH is extensible, it easily allows developers to pro-
vide custom patch templates thereby allowing quick adap-
tion to new attacks against smart contracts. More specifically,
EVMPATCH supports multiple formats for custom patch tem-
plates: EVM instructions, a simple domain-specific language
that resembles Solidity expressions and allows developers
to enforce pre-conditions on functions (similar to Solidity
modifiers). We performed a developer study in Section 5.3
to demonstrate that writing a patch template is feasible and
more successful than manually patching a contract.
If the patch tester finds a new failing transaction, the de-
veloper has to analyze whether a new attack transaction has
been discovered or a legitimate transaction has failed. For a
newly discovered attack transaction, EVMPATCH adds this
transaction to the list of attacks and proceeds. Otherwise, the
developer investigates why the legitimate transaction failed.
As our evaluation in § 5.2.2 shows, such cases typically occur
due to inaccurate vulnerability reports, i.e., wrongly reported
vulnerabilities rather than faulty patching. Thus, the developer
can simply blacklist the wrongly reported vulnerable code
locations to avoid patching at these locations.
These manual interventions typically only need quick code
reviews or debugger sessions. We believe even moderately
experienced Solidity developers can perform these tasks as no
detailed knowledge about the underlying bytecode rewriting
system is needed (see also § 5.3 on our developer study). As
such, EVMPATCH positions itself as a tool to enable more
developers to securely program and operate Ethereum smart
contracts.
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4 EVMPatch Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation of EVM-
PATCH: in § 4.1, we discuss engineering challenges for byte-
code rewriting in Ethereum. Thereafter, we desribe the im-
plementation of the bytecode rewriter (§ 4.2), the patch test-
ing feature (§ 4.3), and the contract deployment mechanism
(§ 4.4). We conclude this section with a discussion on possible
applications regarding smart contract errors in § 4.5.
4.1 Challenges of Bytecode Rewriting
There are several unique challenges that must be solved when
rewriting EVM bytecode: we need to handle static analysis of
the original EVM bytecode, and tackle several particularities
of Solidity contracts and the EVM.
Similar to traditional computer architectures, EVM byte-
code uses addresses to reference code and data constants in
the code address space. Hence, when modifying the bytecode,
the rewriter must ensure that address-based references are
correctly adjusted. To do so, a rewriter typically employ two
static analysis techniques: control-flow graph (CFG) recovery
and subsequent data-flow analysis. The latter is necessary to
determine which instructions are the sources of any address
constants utilized in the code. For the EVM bytecode, two
classes of instructions are relevant in this context: code jumps
and constant data references.
Code Jumps. The EVM features two branch instructions:
JUMP and JUMPI. Both take the destination address from the
stack. Note that function calls inside the same contract also
leverage JUMP and JUMPI. That said, there is no explicit differ-
ence between local jumps inside a function and calls to other
functions. The EVM also features dedicated call instructions,
but these are only used to transfer control to a completely
separate contract. Hence, they do not require modification
when rewriting the bytecode.
Constant Data References. The so-called CODECOPY instruc-
tion is leveraged to copy data from the code address space
into the memory address space. A common example use-case
are large data constants such as strings. Similar to the jump
instructions, the address from which memory is loaded is
passed to the CODECOPY instruction via the stack.
Handling both types of instructions is challenging due to
the stack-based architecture of the EVM. For instance, the tar-
get addresses of jump instructions are always provided on the
stack. That is, every branch is indirect, i.e., the target address
cannot be simply looked up by inspecting the jump instruc-
tion. Instead, to resolve these indirect jumps, one needs to
deploy data-flow analysis techniques to determine where and
which target address is pushed on the stack. For the majority
of these jumps, one can analyze the surrounding basic block4
4A basic block is sequence of EVM instructions that terminate in a branch.
The branch connects one basic block to subsequent basic blocks in the CFG
of the EVM code.
to trace back where the jump target is pushed on the stack.
For example, when observing the instructions PUSH2 0xdb1;
JUMP, we can recover the jump target by retrieving the address
(0xdb1) from the push instruction.
However, many contracts contain more complicated code
patterns, primarily because the Solidity compiler also supports
calling functions internally without utilizing a call instruction.
Recall that, in the EVM, a call instructions perform similarly
to remote-procedure calls. To optimize code size and facilitate
code re-use, the Solidity compiler introduced a concept where
functions are marked as internal. These functions cannot be
called by other contracts (private to the contract) and follow
a different calling convention. Since there are no dedicated
return and call instruction for internal functions, Solidity uti-
lizes the jump instruction to emulate both. As such, a function
return and a normal jump cannot be easily distinguished. This
makes it challenging to (1) identify internal functions and
(2) build an accurate control-flow graph of the contract.
When rewriting an EVM smart contract, both the jump
instructions and the codecopy instruction need to be consid-
ered in the bytecode rewriter. The obvious strategy to rewrite
smart contracts is to fix-up all constant addresses in the code
to reflect the new addresses after inserting new instructions or
removing old instructions. However, this strategy is challeng-
ing because it requires accurate control-flow graph recovery
and data-flow analysis, which needs to deal with particular-
ities of EVM code, such as internal function calls. In the
research area of binary rewriting of traditional architectures,
a more pragmatic approach has been developed: the so-called
trampoline concept [8, 21]. We utilize this approach in our
rewriter and avoid adjusting addresses. Whenever our rewriter
must perform changes to a basic block, e.g., inserting instruc-
tions, our rewriter replaces the basic block with a trampoline
that immediately jumps to the patched copy. Hence, any jump
target in the original code stays the same and all data con-
stants are kept at their original addresses. We describe this
process in more detail in the subsequent section.
4.2 Bytecode Rewriter Implementation
We implemented a trampoline-based rewriter in Python and
utilize the pyevmasm5 library for disassembling and assem-
bling raw EVM opcodes. Our trampoline-based bytecode
rewriter works on the basic block level. When an instruction
needs to be instrumented, the whole basic block is copied to
the end of the contract. The patch is then applied to this new
copy. The original basic block is replaced with a trampoline,
i.e., a short instruction sequence that immediately jumps to
the copied basic block. Whenever the contract jumps to the
basic block at its original address, the trampoline is invoked
redirecting execution to the patched basic block by means of
a jump instruction. To resume execution, the final instruction
of the instrumented basic block issues a jump back into the
5github.com/crytic/pyevmasm
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original contract code. While the trampoline-based approach
avoids fixing up any references, it introduces additional jump
instructions. However, as we will show, the gas cost associ-
ated with these additional jumps is negligible in practice (see
§ 5).
To ensure correct execution, we must still compute at least
a partial control-flow graph, starting from the patched basic
block. This is necessary to recover the boundaries of the ba-
sic blocks that are patched and the following basic blocks
that are connected by a so called fall-through edge. Not all
basic blocks terminate with an explicit control-flow instruc-
tion: Whenever a basic block ends with a conditional jump
instruction (JUMPI) or simply does not end with a control-flow
instruction, there is an implicit edge (i.e., fall-through) in the
control-flow graph to the instruction at the following address.
Handling Fall-Through Edge. To handle the fall-through
edge, two cases must be considered. When the basic block
targeted by the fall-through edge starts with a JUMPDEST in-
struction, the basic block is marked as a legitimate target for
regular jumps in the EVM. In this case, we can append an
explicit jump to the rewritten basic block at the end of the
contract and ensure that execution continues at the beginning
of the following basic block in the original contract code.
In case that the following basic block does not begin with a
JUMPDEST instruction, the EVM forbids explicit jumps to this
address. In the control-flow graph, this means that this basic
block can only be reached with a fall-through edge. To handle
this case, our rewriter copies the basic block to the end of the
contract right behind the rewritten basic block constructing
another fall-through edge in the control-flow graph of the
rewritten code.
Figure 2 shows an example for how our rewriter changes
the control-flow graph of the original contract. The ADD in-
struction is replaced with a checked add routine that addition-
ally performs integer overflow checks. We call the address of
the ADD instruction the patch point. The basic block, which
contains the patch point, is replaced with a trampoline. In
this case, it immediately jumps to the basic block at 0xFFB.
This basic block, which is placed at the end of the original
contract, is a copy of the original basic block at 0xAB, but
with the patch applied. Since the basic block is now at the end
of the contract, the bytecode rewriter can insert, change, and
remove instructions in the basic block without changing any
address in code that is located at higher-numbered addresses.
We fill the rest of the original basic block with the INVALID
instruction to ensure the basic block has the exact same size as
the original basic block. The basic block at 0xCD is connected
to the prior basic block by means of a fall-through edge. How-
ever, this basic block starts with a JUMPDEST instruction and
as such is a legitimate jump target. Hence, the rewriter then
appends a jump to the patched basic block at 0xFFB which
ensures execution continues in the original contract’s code at
address 0xCD.
Adapting to EVM. The EVM has some particularities that
Original Code Rewritten Code
...
PUSH1 0x01
ADD
POP
...
PUSH2 0x0FFB
JUMP
_____________
INVALID
INVALID
...
INVALID
JUMPDEST
...
⇒ JUMPDEST...
JUMPDEST
...
PUSH1 0x01
[ CHECKED_ADD ]
POP
...
PUSH1 0xCD
JUMP
Patch Point
0xAB
0xCD
0xAB
0xCD
0xFFB
Figure 2: Control-flow graph of original and rewritten code.
must be considered when implementing a bytecode rewriter.
Namely, the EVM enforces some separation of code and data
in the code address space. EVM implementations prevent
jumps into the data constants that are embedded into PUSH
instructions. The constant operands of the push instructions
follow directly after the byte of the push instruction opcode.
Such a constant operand can accidentally include the byte for
the JUMPDEST instruction. Then, the constant would be a legit-
imate jump target and a new unintended instruction sequence
would occur. To avoid such unintended instruction sequences,
EVM implementations perform a linear sweep over the code
section to find all push instructions. The constants that are
part of those push instructions are then marked as data and
therefore as invalid jump targets, even if they contain a byte
equivalent to the JUMPDEST instruction. However, due to per-
formance reasons, EVM implementations ignore control-flow
information when marking data. As such, the push instruc-
tions opcode byte itself can be part of some data constant,
such as a string or other binary data. For this reason, smart
contract compilers accumulate all data constants at addresses
strictly larger than any reachable code, avoiding any conflicts
between the generated code and data encoded into the code
address space. However, our trampoline-based rewriter does
append code behind the data constants of the smart contracts.
To avoid that code appended by the rewriter is accidentally
marked as an invalid jump destination due to a preceding push
opcode byte, we carefully insert padding between the data of
the original contract and the newly appended code.
Applicability of Trampoline Approach. The trampoline-
based approach to rewriting requires only minimal code anal-
ysis and works for most use cases. However, this approach
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faces two problems. First, instructions can only be patched in
basic blocks that are large enough (in terms of size in bytes)
to also contain the trampoline code. However, a typical tram-
poline requires 4 to 5 bytes and typically basic blocks that
perform some meaningful computation are large enough to
contain the trampoline code. Second, due to the copying of
basic blocks the code size increases depending on the ba-
sic block that is patched thereby increasing deployment cost.
However, our experiments show that the overhead during de-
ployment is negligible (on average US$0.02 per deployment,
see § 5).
No reliance on accurate control-flow graph. Recovering
an accurate control-flow graph given only EVM bytecode is
a challenging and open problem. However, our trampoline
based approach does not require an accurate and complete
control-flow graph. Instead, we only need to recover basic
block boundaries given the program counter of the instruction,
where the patch needs to be applied. In doing so, recovering
the basic block boundaries is tractable, since the EVM has
an explicit marker for basic block entries (i.e., the JUMPDEST
pseudo-instruction). Furthermore, our rewriter only needs to
recover the end of the basic block and any following basic
blocks that are connected via fallthrough edges in the control-
flow graph.
4.3 Patch Testing
While the insertion of trampolines into the original code does
not change the functionality of the contract, the patch template
itself can perform arbitrary computations and could poten-
tially violate the semantics of the patched contract. To test the
patched contract, EVMPATCH utilizes a differential testing
approach. That is, we re-execute all transactions of the con-
tract to determine if the behavior of the original, vulnerable
code and the newly, patched code differ. EVMPATCH utilizes
past transactions to the contract retrieved directly from the
blockchain. If the contract comes with unit tests, EVMPATCH
also utilizes the unit tests to test the newly patched contract.
This differential testing approach cannot guarantee formal
correctness of the contract. Contracts with a low number of
available transactions are prone to low test coverage. How-
ever, our experiments (see § 5.2.1) show that the differential
testing approach works well enough in practice to show that
the patches do not break functionality. Given the availabil-
ity of a formal specification of the contract’s functionality,
EVMPATCH could also leverage a model checker to validate
a patched contract more rigorously.
During differential testing, we first retrieve a list of transac-
tions to the vulnerable contract from the blockchain. Second,
we re-execute all those transactions and retrieve the execution
trace for each transaction. Then, we then re-execute the same
transactions, but replace the code of the vulnerable contract
with the patched contract code, to obtain the second execu-
tion trace. We use a modified Ethereum client, based on the
popular go-ethereum client6, since the original client does not
support this functionality. Finally, we compare both execu-
tion traces and the patch tester produces a list of transactions,
where the behavior differs. If there are no such transactions,
then we assume that the patch does not inhibit the function-
ality of the contract and proceed with deploying the patched
contract.
The execution traces of the original and patched contracts
are never equal since patching changes control flow and in-
serts instructions. Hence, we examine only potentially state-
changing instructions, i.e., instructions that either write to the
storage area (i.e., a SSTORE) or transfer execution flow to an-
other contract (e.g., a CALL instruction). We then compare the
order, parameters, and result of all state-changing instructions
and find the first instruction where the two execution traces
differ. Currently, we assume that the introduced patches do
not result in any new state-changing instructions. This as-
sumption holds for patches that introduce input-validation
code and revert when invalid input is passed. However, the
trace difference computation can be adapted to become aware
of potential state changes that a patch introduces.Reported
transactions that fail in the code, which is part of the patch,
are marked as potential attack transactions. If the reported
transaction failed due to out-of-gas in the patched code, we
re-run the same transaction with an increased gas budget. We
issue a warning since users will have to account for addi-
tional gas cost introduced by the patch. Finally, the developer
must examine the reported transactions to decide whether
the given list of transactions are legitimate or malicious. As
a side-effect, this makes our patch tester an attack detection
tool for the vulnerable contract allowing developers to quickly
find prior attack transactions.
4.4 Deployment of Patched Contracts
As described in § 3, EVMPATCH utilizes the delegatecall-
proxy based upgrade pattern to deploy the patched contract.
To achieve this, EVMPATCH splits the smart contract to two
contracts: a proxy contract and a logic contract. The proxy
contract is the primary entry point and stores all data. By
default, EVMPATCH utilizes a proxy contract that is shipped
with EVMPATCH. However, EVMPATCH can also re-use
existing upgradable contracts, such as contracts developed
with the ZeppelinOS framework [46]. Users interact with the
proxy contract, which is located at a fixed address. To facili-
tate the upgrade process, the proxy contract also implements
functionality to update the address of the logic contract. To
prevent malicious upgrades, the proxy contract also stores the
address of an owner, who is allowed to issue upgrades. The
upgrade then simply consists of sending one transaction to
the proxy contract, which will (1) check whether the caller is
the owner and (2) update the address of the logic contract.
6We utilized version 1.8.27-stable-3e76a291
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The proxy contract retrieves the address of the new logic
contract from storage and simply forwards all calls to that con-
tract. Internally, the proxy contract utilizes the DELEGATECALL
instruction to call into the logic contract. This allows the logic
contract to gain full access to the storage memory area of the
proxy contract thereby allowing access to the persistent data
without any additional overhead.
4.5 Possible Applications
The bytecode rewriter takes a patch template, which is speci-
fied as short snippet of EVM assembly language. This tem-
plate is then specialized according to the patched contract and
relocated to the end of the patched contract. This template-
based approach to patch generation allows to specify multiple
generic patches to address whole classes of vulnerabilities. In
the following, we list possible vulnerability classes that can
immediately benefit from our framework.
Improper access control to critical functions can be patched
by just inserting a check at the beginning of a function to
verify that the caller is a certain fixed address or equal to
some address stored in the contract’s state. Detection tools
to handle this vulnerability have been investigated in prior
work [20, 28].
Mishandled exceptions can occur when the contract uses a
low-level call instruction, where the return value is not han-
dled automatically, and the contract does not properly check
the return value [23]. This issue can be patched by inserting a
generic return-value check after such a call instructions.
Integer bugs are highly likely to occur when dealing with
integer arithmetic since Solidity does not utilize checked arith-
metic by default. This has resulted in many potentially vul-
nerable contracts being deployed and some being actively
attacked [13, 30]. Given the prevalence of these vulnerabili-
ties, we discuss in the next section how to automatically patch
integer overflow bugs using EVMPATCH.
In what follows, we demonstrate the effectiveness of EVM-
PATCH by applying it to the two major bug classes of access
control errors and integer bugs.
5 Evaluation of EVMPATCH
In this section, we report the evaluation results of EVMPATCH
in patching two prominent types of bugs: (1) access control
bugs, and (2) integer bugs (over-/underflow).
5.1 Patching Access Control Bugs
The Parity MultiSig Wallet is a prominent example for access
control errors [3, 39]. This contract implements a wallet that
is owned by multiple accounts. Any action taken by the wallet
contract must be authorized by at least one of the owners.
However, the contract suffered from a fatal bug that allowed
anyone to become the sole owner because the corresponding
1 function initMultiowned(address[] _owners, uint _required)
2 À internal {
3 // ...
4 function initDaylimit(uint _limit) À internal {
5 // ...
6 // throw unless the contract is not yet initialized.
7 modifier only_uninitialized { if (m_numOwners > 0) throw; _;}
8
9 function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required,
10 uint _daylimit)
11 Á only_uninitialized {
12 // ...
Figure 3: Source code of patched Parity Multisig Wallet.
functions initWallet, initMultiowned, and initDayLimit did not
perform any access control checks.
Figure 3 shows the patched source code which adds the
internal modifier to the functions initMultiowned and init-
DayLimit (marked with À in Figure 3). This modifier makes
these two functions inaccessible via the outside interface of
the deployed contract. Furthermore, the patch adds the cus-
tom modifier only_uninitialized, which checks whether the
contract was previously initialized (marked with Á).
The developers originally introduced a new vulnerability
while deploying the patched the contract, which was actively
exploited [38]. In contrast, because EVMPATCH performs
bytecode rewriting, it would have immediately generated a
securely patched version of the contract and would have de-
ployed it automatically in a secure manner.
Consider Figure 4 which shows a customized patch in
the domain-specific language employed by EVMPATCH to
specify patches. As such, we insert a patch at the beginning
of the initWallet function that checks whether the condition
sload(m_numOwners) == 0 holds, i.e., whether the contract
is not yet initialized. If this does not hold, the contract execu-
tion will abort with a REVERT instruction. Note that here an
explicit sload needs to be used to load variables from storage
and the expression is logically inverted from the patch in Fig-
ure 3, since this patch essentially inserts a Solidity require
statement. Furthermore, two other publicly accessible func-
tions need to be removed from the public function dispatcher.
The patch shown in Figure 4 combines two existing patch
templates provided by EVMPATCH. First, the add require
patch template enforces a pre-condition before a function is
entered. Second, the delete public function patch template
removes a public function from the dispatcher, effectively
marking the function as internal.
Evaluation Results.We verified that the patched contract is
no longer exploitable by deploying a patched version of the
WalletLibrary contract against the attack. Further, we compare
a source-level patch with the patch applied by EVMPATCH.
Table 2 shows an overview of the results. EVMPATCH only
increases contract size by 25 B. The additional gas cost of
the initWallet function is only 235 gas, i.e., 0.000,06 USD per
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1 add_require_patch:
2 initWallet:
3 - sload(m_numOwner) == 0
4
5 delete_public_function_patch:
6 - initDayLimit
7 - initMultiowned
Figure 4: Customized Patch for Partity Multsig Wallet.
transaction for 235.091 USD/ETH and a typical gas price of
1 Gwei. This demonstrates that EVMPATCH can efficiently
and effectively insert patches for access control bugs.
5.2 Patching Integer Bugs
Typical integer types are bound to a minimum and/or maxi-
mum size due to the fixed bit-width of the integer type. How-
ever, programmers often do not pay sufficient attention to
the size limitation of the actual integer type potentially caus-
ing integer bugs. Fortunately, several high-level programming
languages (Python, Scheme) are able to avoid integer bugs
since they leverage arbitrary precision integers with virtually
unlimited size. However, the de-facto standard programming
language for smart contracts, namely Solidity, does not embed
such a mechanism. This leaves the burden of handling integer
overflows completely on the developer who needs to either
manually implement overflow checks or properly utilize the
SafeMath library to safely perform numeric operations [33].
While common, the former is obviously error-prone. For in-
stance, multiple vulnerabilities in ERC-20 token contracts
were recently unveiled [1, 26, 27]. These contracts manage
subcurrencies, so-called tokens, on the Ethereum blockchain.
Such tokens can deal with large amounts of currency since
they track the token balance of every token owner and mediate
the exchange of tokens and Ether. Figure 5 shows an excerpt
of the BEC token contract’s code that exemplifies such integer
overflow vulnerabilities. When computing the total amount in
Line 6, an unchecked integer multiplication is used allowing
an attacker to provide a very large _value. As a consequence,
the amount variable will be set to a small amount. This ef-
fectively bypasses the balance check in Line 11 allowing the
attacker to transfer a large amount of tokens to an attacker-
controlled account. Recently, similar vulnerabilities have been
Table 2: Overhead of access control patch.
Version Bytes Size Increase Gas Increase
Original 8290 0 % 0
Source-Patched 8201 −1.07 % 226
EVMPATCH’ed 8315 0.3 % 235
1 function batchTransfer(address[] _receivers, uint256 _value)
2 public whenNotPaused returns (bool) {
3 uint cnt = _receivers.length;
4 // OVERFLOW: 2 * ((INT_MAX / 2) + 1) == 0
5 uint256 amount = uint256(cnt) * _value;
6 require(cnt > 0 && cnt <= 20);
7 // BYPASSED CHECK: balances[msg.sender] >= 0
8 require(_value > 0 && balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
9 // RESULT: Transfer of ((INT_MAX / 2) + 1) tokens
Figure 5: Integer overflow bug reported by PeckShield [1].
discovered in over 42,000 contracts [13].
We developed patch templates for detecting integer over-
flows and underflows for the standard EVM integer width,
i.e., unsigned 256 bit integers. For integer addition, subtrac-
tion, and multiplication, these templates add checks inspired
by secure coding rules in the C programming language [34]
and the SafeMath [33] Solidity library. When a violation is
detected, EVMPATCH issues an exception to abort and roll
back the current call to the contract.
5.2.1 Evaluation Results
To verify the correctness of the patches generated by our byte-
code rewriter, we utilized the state-of-the-art integer detection
tool Osiris [13] for vulnerability detection. After analyzing
50,535 unique contracts in the first 5,000,000 blocks of the
Ethereum blockchain, Osiris detects at least one integer over-
flow vulnerability in 14,107 contracts. Using EVMPATCH,
we were able to successfully patch almost all of these con-
tracts automatically. More specifically, we could not patch 33
contracts amongst the 14107 investigated contracts because
the basic block, where the detected vulnerability was located
is too small for the trampoline code.
From those 14107 contracts, around 8000 involve trans-
actions on the Ethereum network. To generate a large and
representative evaluation data set, we extracted all transac-
tions sent to these contracts up to block 7,755,100 (May 13
2019) from the Ethereum blockchain resulting in 26,385,532
transactions.
Replaying those transactions with our patch tester shows
that for 95.5 % of all vulnerable contracts, EVMPATCH’s
generated patch was compliant to all of the prior transactions
associated with those contracts. For the remaining 4.5 % of
the investigated contracts, our patch rejected transactions for
one of the following reasons: (1) we successfully stopped
a malicious transaction, (2) the reported vulnerability was a
false positive and should not have been patched, or (3) we
unintentionally changed the contract’s functionality.
For close scrutiny, we selected ERC-20 token contracts
from those contracts that could be successfully patched by
EVMPATCH with confirmed integer overflow/underflow vul-
nerabilities that have been successfully attacked (see Table 3).
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Contract CVE # Patches
# Transactions Overhead (gas) Code Size Increase (B) Additional Cost RW (US$)
Total Attacks RW SM RW SM per TX per Upgrade
BEC [2] 2018-10299 1 424,229 1 83 164 117 (1.0%) 133 (1.1%) < 0.01 0.01
SMT [36] 2018-10376 1 56,555 1 47 108 191 (0.8%) 97 (0.4%) < 0.01 0.01
UET [43] 2018-10468 55 24,034 12 225 21 1,299 (18.2%) 541 (7.6%) < 0.01 0.071
SCA [37] 2018-10706 1 292 10 47 0 3,811 (17.3%) 361 (1.6%) < 0.01 0.189
HXG [17] 2018-11239 9 1497 5 120 541 997 (28.1%) 519 (14.6%) < 0.01 0.057
Table 3: ERC-20 Token contracts investigated in depth with their respective CVE number, the number of patches introduced by EVMPATCH,
and the number of transactions replayed by EVMPATCH’s patch tester and the number of attack transactions identified while testing the patches.
We also give the average amount of overhead in gas consumption over all replayed transactions and overhead of contract size of the manual
patched contracts (SM) and rewriter-generated patches (RW) and the overhead of the rewriter converted to US$ (with a gas price of 1 Gwei and
235 US$/eth; For readability we only show the exact US$ figures only if they are more than one cent).
For comparison purposes, we also manually patch these con-
tracts on the Solidity source code level by replacing the vul-
nerable arithmetic operations with functions adapted from
the SafeMath library [33]. The manually patched source code
is then compiled with the exact same Solidity compiler ver-
sion and optimization options used in the original contract (as
reported on etherscan.io).
We applied the EVMPATCH patch tester to the generated
patched contract versions and validated the reported outcome.
This allows us to verify whether both patching approaches
abort the same attack transactions. In addition, we can com-
pare the overhead in gas consumption and the increase in
code size. Note that in the manual patching method, we do
not patch all potential vulnerabilities detected by Osiris as
we skip adding checks on those arithmetic operations which
cannot be exploited by an attacker, i.e., vulnerable arithmetic
operations contained in functions that can only be called by
the controller or owner of the contract. We verified the correct-
ness of our patches using a total number of 506,607 real-world
transactions associated with the ERC-20 token contracts listed
in Table 3.
Table 3 shows the transaction execution results of the patch
tester. We verified the aborted transactions and confirm that
all of them correspond to genuine attacks except for one trans-
action7, which resembles a special case of token burning that
we discuss in detail below. Apart from the valid attack trans-
actions, the execution traces of the re-executed transactions
match those of the original transactions, confirming that our
patch does not break the contract’s functionality.
Out of the transactions identified as attacks, we found one
particular transaction to the HXG token [17]. The transaction
does indeed trigger an integer overflow but the HXG token
rather burns some tokens by transferring them to a blackhole
address 0x0. The burned tokens cannot be recovered and the
balance of the blackhole address does not influence the behav-
ior of the contract. When analyzing the contract, Osiris is not
aware of the semantics of this blackhole address and reports
70x776da02ce8ce3cc882eb7f8104c31414f9fc756405745690bcf8df21e779e8a4
a possible integer overflow. EVMPATCH then conservatively
patches the integer overflow bugs reported by Osiris, which
leads to one legitimate transaction failing. We argue that this
pattern can be seen as bad coding practice as it wastes gas in
unnecessarily storing the balance of the blackhole address.
Gas Overhead. The additional code introduced by the patch-
ing may potentially cause transactions to fail with an out-of-
gas error. While the patches generally do not significantly
increase gas consumption, such a behavior can nevertheless
occur when the sender of the transactions provides a very
tight gas budget. When the re-execution of a transaction with
patched code fails early due to an out-of-gas exception, we
could not accurately compare the behavior of the patched con-
tract with the original contract. To remedy this, we disabled
the gas-accounting in the EVM. We report the amount of
additional gas consumption during transaction execution in
Table 3. We excluded those transactions that do not execute
functions which contain the vulnerable code, because they
are not affected by the patches and therefore not relevant to
our measurements.
Our results show that for contracts BEC, SMT, and HXG,
those patched with EVMPATCH incur less gas overhead
at runtime (83 gas, 47 gas and 120 gas) when compared to
those patched on the source code level (164 gas, 108 gas and
541 gas). This is due to the fact that the Solidity compiler gen-
erates non-optimal code when only very few checks are added.
In particular, Solidity utilizes internal function calls to invoke
the SafeMath integer overflow checks. While this reduces
code size (in case the check is needed at multiple places), it
always requires executing additional instructions—thereby in-
creasing gas overhead—to invoke and return from the internal
function. In contrast, EVMPATCH inlines the safe numeric
operations thereby introducing less gas overhead. One would
need to instruct the Solidity compiler to selectively enable
function inlining to yield similar gas costs as EVMPATCH.
Note that the average gas overhead is 0 gas for the manually
patched SCA token. This is because only one transaction
triggers the SafeMath integer overflow check. However, this
is an attack transaction and it is aborted early, making gas
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overhead calculation not possible.
For UET and SCA, we identify higher gas overhead than
for the manually patched version. In fact, UET requires on
average 255 units of additional gas for every transaction in
the patched version. In contrast, only 21 gas is added for man-
ually patched version. This is due to the fact that our bytecode
rewriter conservatively patches every potential vulnerability
reported by Osiris in these two contracts (12 and 10 respec-
tively). However, not all of them are actually exploitable and
as such we did not instrument them during manual patching.
Code Size Increase. Deploying contracts in the Ethereum
blockchain also incurs costs proportionally to the size
of the deployed contract. More specifically, Ethereum
charges 200 gas per byte to store the contract code on the
blockchain [44]. From Table 3, we recognize that the amount
of extra code added by our rewriter is comparable to that of
the SafeMath approach when a single vulnerability is patched.
Since our approach duplicates the original basic blocks, the
code size overhead depends on the specific location of the vul-
nerability. In the case of the BEC token contract, our rewriter
increases the code size less than the source-level patches. The
Solidity compiler generates more code for including the Safe-
Math library than is strictly necessary for the patch. Even
considering the overhead of bytecode rewriting, we observe
that EVMPATCH generates a smaller patch than the manual
patching method for this contract.
However, in case many vulnerabilities are patched, EVM-
PATCH adds a slightly higher overhead. Naturally, the size
of the upgraded contracts increases with the number of vul-
nerabilities to fix due to inlining. For instance, our bytecode
rewriter generates 12 patches for UET contract and 10 patches
for SCA contract resulting in 1299 B (18.2%) and 3811 B
(17.3%) increase in code size. In the worst-case scenario
in our dataset, this increase in code size induces negligible
additional cost of US$0.18 per deployment.
Our patch templates are currently optimized for patching
a single vulnerable arithmetic. It is straightforward to adopt
an approach akin to Solidity’s internal function calls when
developing patch templates for our bytecode rewriter, which
would reduce the code size overhead when patching many
integer overflows.
EVMPATCH applies 3.9 patches on average to a contract in
our data set of 14,107 contracts. The average code size of the
original contracts is 8142.7 B (σ 5327.8 B). The average size
increase after applying patches with EVMPATCH is 455.9 B
(σ 333.5 B). This amounts to an average code size overhead of
5.6% after applying the patches. Given that Ethereum charges
200 gas per byte to the contract creation transaction, it incurs
an average overhead of 91,180 gas or US$0.02 at the time
of writing. In the worst case that we observed, EVMPATCH
incurs an overhead of 199,800 gas at deployment, which at
the time of writing only amounts to about US$0.04 additional
deployment cost. This shows that the overhead of applying
patches with bytecode rewriting is negligible for contract
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Figure 6: Activity timeline of each contract. The grey shadow indi-
cates the time window in which the vulnerabilities of these contracts
are disclosed by Peckshield [30], and the big hollow points signify
the occurrences of the attacks.
deployment, especially when compared to the number of Ether
possibly at stake.
Costs of Deployment. The deployment cost of a newly
patched contract dominates the costs of operating a smart
contract with EVMPATCH. However, additionally there is
a transaction needed to switch the address of the logic con-
tract. Since the proxy pattern requires no state migration, this
transaction requires a constant amount of gas. The proxy con-
tract we utilize in EVMPATCH consumes 43.167 gas during
a switchover transaction, i.e., about US$0.01. Currently, state
migration is the most viable contract upgrade strategy be-
sides the proxy pattern. Prior work estimated that even with
only 5000 ERC-20 holders, i.e., smart contract users, state
migration will likely cost more than US$100.00 in the best
case [41]. Hence, compared to the cost of migrating all data to
a new contract, the EVMPATCH’s additional cost of US$0.01
is negligible.
Detecting Attacks. The patch tester of EVMPATCH allows
us to also identify any prior attack transactions. In Figure 6,
we additionally observe that while the vulnerabilities of the
other token contracts have been reported within a fairly rea-
sonable time after the first attack, UET has been exploited (5
months) long before the bug disclosure. More surprisingly,
all contracts are still fairly active though they encountered a
decrease of transaction volume after public disclosure of the
vulnerabilities. Despite the fact that all of these vulnerabil-
ities have been discovered around one year before the time
of writing, there are still 23,630 transactions (4.66 % of the
evaluated transactions) issued to these vulnerable contracts
after the public disclosure of the vulnerabilities, including suc-
cessful attacks. This means that the owners of those contracts
did not properly migrate to patched versions and users were
not properly notified of the vulnerable state of these contracts.
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5.2.2 Analysis of False Positives/Negatives
During our analysis of the vulnerable contracts, we identified
false positives and false negatives caused by vulnerability
reporting of Osiris [13]. This demonstrates that our patch
testing is an important step in the process as many analysis
tools are imprecise. We found that in the default configuration,
Osiris often achieves limited code coverage. To this end, we
utilized different timeout settings for both the whole analysis
and for queries to the SMT solver and combined the results of
multiple runs to achieve better code coverage. Furthermore,
we found that—contrary to the claims in the original Osiris
paper [13]—not all vulnerabilities are accurately detected by
Osiris in two particular cases.
Hexagon (HXG) Token. This contract is vulnerable to an
integer overflow, which allows an attacker to transfer very
large amounts of ERC-20 tokens [26]. Osiris reports two false
positives, which are caused by EVM code that is generated
by the Solidity compiler. Even though all types are unsigned
types in the Solidity source code, the compiler generates a
signed addition. Here, Osiris reports a possible integer over-
flow, when −2 is added to the balanceOf mapping variable.
When performing signed integer additions with negative val-
ues, the addition naturally overflows when the result moves
from the negative value range into the positive value range
and vice versa. As such, EVMPATCH patches a checked ad-
dition for an unsigned arithmetic operation which will always
overflow. With our patch tester we observe all the failing trans-
actions and perform manual analysis of the patched contract’s
bytecode to determine that the root cause is an issue in the So-
lidity compiler, i.e., the generated code requires an additional
instruction, when compared to a simple unsigned subtraction.
Social Chain (SCA). Our results also show a problem with
Osiris when analyzing the SCA token. While Osiris does de-
tect a possible overflow during multiplication in the problem-
atic Solidity source code line, it does not detect the possible
integer overflow for an addition in the same source code line.
However, in the actual attack transaction, the integer overflow
happens during the not-flagged addition operation. As such,
this constitutes a false negative problem of Osiris. Since the
vulnerable addition is not reported by Osiris, it is also not
automatically patched by EVMPATCH. In contrast, for the
manually patched version we took both arithmetic operations
into account. The related attack transaction was previously
reported as an attack transaction [27].
Summary of Evaluation. To summarize, our evaluation on
integer overflow detection shows that EVMPATCH can cor-
rectly apply patches to smart contracts preventing any inte-
ger overflow attack. Furthermore, EVMPATCH incurs only
a negligible gas overhead during deployment and runtime;
especially compared to the Ether at stake. Our analysis shows
that the analyzed vulnerable smart contracts are still in ac-
tive use, even after being attacked and the vulnerabilities
being publicly disclosed. This motivates the need for a timely
patching framework such as EVMPATCH. Lastly, based on
an extensive and detailed analysis of 26,385,532 transactions,
we demonstrate that EVMPATCH always preserves the con-
tract’s original functionality except for a few cases, where the
vulnerability report (generated by the third-party tool Osiris)
was not accurate or bad coding practices were used (blackhole
address).
5.3 Developer Study
Developer Background. To quantify the manual effort
needed to patch smart contracts and evaluate the usefulness
of EVMPATCH we conducted a thorough study with 6 pro-
fessional developers with varying prior experience in using
blockchain technologies and developing smart contracts. Our
developers consider themselves familiar with blockchain tech-
nologies but not very familiar with developing Solidity code.
None of the developers have developed an upgradable con-
tract before. As such, we can quantify the effort needed for
a smart contract developer to learn and apply an upgradable
contract pattern.
Methodology. Throughout our study, we asked the develop-
ers to perform multiple tasks manually that are performed
automatically by EVMPATCH: (1) manually patch three con-
tracts vulnerable due to integer overflow bugs given the output
of a static analyzer (OSIRIS [13]), (2) convert a contract to
an upgradable contract manually and with EVMPATCH, and
(3) patch an access control bug using EVMPATCH by writing
a custom patch-template. The three tasks cover different sce-
narios, where EVMPATCH can be useful to a developer. The
first two tasks cover the use of EVMPATCH to patch known
bug classes with minimal human intervention. For these two
tasks we assume no prior knowledge on patching smart con-
tracts (see Table 5 how developers rated their prior experience
with smart contracts). In contrast, the third task consists of
extending EVMPATCH. This requires understanding a bug
class and perform root cause analysis to properly patch the
vulnerability. This is surely more challenging compared to
the previous two tasks. Since the third task covers a different
Table 4: Timing results for the tasks as reported by the developers
given in minutes and their reported confidence in the correctness of
their results.
Task Time (Minutes) Confidence
Median Min Max Median (1-7)
Manual Integer
Patches
47.50 35 78 6
Conversion 62.50 33 110 2.5
EVMPATCH
Conversion
1.50 1 3 -
Patch Template 4.00 2 15 7
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bug class, we believe there is no significant bias in the data
due to the developers completing the other two tasks first.
For all tasks, we measured the time required by the de-
veloper to perform the task (excluding the time required for
reading the tasks’ description). We asked the developers to
rate their familiarity with relevant technologies, their confi-
dence levels in their patches, and the difficulty of performing
the tasks on a 7-point Likert scale. The full questionnaire
and the answers of the developers are shown in Table 5, and
the recorded time measurements are shown in Table 4. We
provide the supporting files in a github repository.8
We then performed both a manual code review and a cross-
check with EVMPATCH to analyze mistakes made by the
developers. The results of our study show that significant ef-
fort is needed to correctly patch smart contracts manually,
whereas EVMPATCH enables simple, user-friendly, and effi-
cient patching. The time measurements show that the devel-
opers, who had no prior experience with EVMPATCH, were
able to perform complex tasks utilizing EVMPATCH within
minutes.
Patching Integer Overflow Bugs. We asked the develop-
ers to fix all integer overflow vulnerabilities in three con-
tracts: 1 BEC [2] (CVE-2018-10299, 299 lines of code),
and 2 HXG [17] (CVE-2018-11239, 102 lines of code) and
3 SCA [37] (CVE-2018-10706, 404 lines of code). To provide
a representative set of contracts, we chose three ERC-20 con-
tracts with varying complexity (in terms of lines of code) and
where the static analysis also includes missed bugs and false
alarms (see § 5.2.2). We ran OSIRIS on all three contracts
and provided the developers the analysis output as well as
a copy of the SafeMath Solidity library. This accurately re-
sembles a real-world scenario, where a blockchain developer
quickly needs to patch a smart contract based on the analysis
results of recent state-of-the-art vulnerability analysis tools
and can look-up manual patching tutorials available online.
All developers manually and correctly patched the source
code of all three contracts which demonstrates their exper-
tise in blockchain development. However, on the downside,
it took the developers on average 51.8 min (σ = 16.6min)
to create patched version for the three contracts. In contrast,
EVMPATCH fully automates the patching process and is able
to generate patches for the three contracts within a maximum
of 10 s.
Converting to an Upgradable Contract. The developers
had to convert a given smart contract into an upgradable smart
contract. We provided the developers a short description of the
delegatecall-proxy pattern and asked them to convert the given
contract into two contracts: one proxy contract and a logic
contract, which is based on the original contract. We provided
no further information on how to handle the storage-layout
problem, and we explicitly allowed using code found online.
The developers required an average of 66.3 min9 to convert a
8github.com/uni-due-syssec/evmpatch-developer-study
9σ= 31.3min, fastest 33 min and slowest 110 min
contract into an upgradable contract. None of the developers
performed a correct conversion into an upgradable contract,
which is also reflected in a median confidence of 2.5 in the
correctness reported by the developers. We observed two
major mistakes: (a) The proxy contract would only support a
fixed set of functions, i.e., the proxy would not support adding
functions to the contract, and (b) more importantly, only one
out of six developers correctly handled storage collisions in
the proxy and logic contract, i.e., five of the six converted
contracts were broken by design. Hence, it remains open how
long it would take developers to perform a correct conversion.
Next, we asked the developers to utilize EVMPATCH to
create and deploy an upgradable contract. As EVMPATCH
does not require any prior knowledge about upgradable con-
tracts, the developers were able to deploy a correct upgrad-
able contract within at most 3 min. In addition, patching with
EVMPATCH inspires high confidence—a median of 7, the
best rating on our scale—in the correctness of the patch. This
gives a strong confirmation that deployment of a proxy with
EVMPATCH is indeed superior to manual patching and up-
grading.
Extending EVMPATCH. The developers had to write a cus-
tom patch template for EVMPATCH. We instructed the devel-
opers on how to use EVMPATCH and how patch templates
are written with EVMPATCH’s patch template language (see
Figure 4 for an example). Furthermore, we presented the
developers an extended bug report that shows how an ac-
cess control bug can be exploited. The developers leveraged
the full EVMPATCH system, i.e., EVMPATCH applies the
patch and validates the patch using the patch tester compo-
nent which replays past transactions from the blockchain
and notifies the developer whether: (a) the patch prevents a
known attack, and (b) whether the patch broke functionality
in other prior legitimate transactions. As such, EVMPATCH
allowed the developers to create a fully functional and se-
curely patched upgradable contract within a few minutes. On
average, the developers only needed 5.5 min, and a maximum
of 15 min, to create a custom patch template. As expected, all
developers correctly patched the given contract using EVM-
PATCH, because a faulty patch would have been reported by
EVMPATCH’s patch tester to the developer. EVMPATCH’s
integrated patch tester gives the developers a high confidence
into their patch. On average, the developers reported a con-
fidence level of 6.6 (σ= 0.4), where 7 is the most confident.
Furthermore, none of the developers considered writing such
a custom patch template as particularly difficult.
Summary. Our study provides confirmation that EVMPATCH
offers a high degree of automation, efficiency, and usability
thereby freeing developers from manual and error-prone tasks.
In particular, none of the six developers were able to produce
a correct upgradable contract mainly due to the difficulty
of preserving the storage-layout. Our study also confirms
that extending EVMPATCH with custom patch templates is
a feasible task, even for developers that are unaware of the
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inner workings of EVMPATCH.
6 Related Work
The infamous attack against “TheDAO” contract [7] received
considerable attention from the community. Since then, many
additional exploits and defenses, which mostly focus on dis-
covering bugs before the contract is deployed, were revealed.
Luu et al. presented the symbolic executor Oyente that ex-
plores a contracts code, while looking for possible vulnera-
bilities [23]. Since then many other symbolic execution tools
with better precision, performance, and covering different vul-
nerabilities have been proposed [13, 20, 24, 25, 28]. Further-
more, static analyzers for both Solidity [12] and EVM byte-
code have been proposed [42]. Information flow analysis and
data sanitization in a multi-transaction setting is analyzed by
Ethainter [4]. Furthermore, methods from formal verification
and model checking have been applied to smart contracts [14,
19] and the semantics of the EVM and Solidity language
have been formalized [15, 18]. However, only a small body
of prior work has researched dynamic analysis and runtime
protections. Tools such as Sereum [32] or ECFChecker [16]
can detect live reentrancy attacks on vulnerable contracts.
Recent work has further explored modular dynamic analysis
frameworks for protecting smart contracts [6, 40]. Protec-
tion solutions that require modifications to the smart contract
execution environment are unlikely to be integrated in to pro-
duction blockchain systems.
Integer overflows have been widely studied in the context
of Ethereum smart contracts. Osiris [13] is an extension to
the symbolic execution tool Oyente [23] to accurately detect
integer bugs. The improved symbolic execution engine first at-
tempts to infer the integer type, i.e., signedness and bit width,
from the specific instructions generated by Solidity compilers.
Next, it checks for possible integer bugs, such as truncation,
overflow, underflow, and wrong type casts. We leverage the
detection capabilities of Osiris, because it pinpoints the ex-
act location of the integer overflow bug. Other tools such as
TeEther [20] and MAIAN [28] implicitly find integer bugs
when they generate exploits for smart contracts. However,
they do not report the exact location of the integer overflow,
because they focus on exploit generation. ZEUS [19] utilizes
abstract interpretation and symbolic model checking to verify
safety properties of smart contracts. While ZEUS can de-
tect potential integer overflow vulnerabilities, it does so at
the LLVM intermediate level and cannot determine the exact
location in the corresponding EVM bytecode.
Recently, bytecode rewriting for patching smart con-
tracts has been explored with SMARTSHIELD [47].
SMARTSHIELD requires a complete control-flow graph
(CFG) to update jump targets and data references. As dis-
cussed in § 4.1, generating a highly accurate CFG is highly
challenging due to the EVM’s bytecode format. We believe
that such a bytecode rewriting strategy does not scale to larger
and more complicated contracts. In contrast, EVMPATCH’s
trampoline-based rewriting strategy does not require an accu-
rate CFG and is much more resilient when rewriting complex
contracts. SMARTSHIELD implements custom bytecode
analysis to detect vulnerabilities, which may not be as accurate
as specialized analyses. For example, SMARTSHIELD’s anal-
ysis does not infer whether an integer type is signed, which is
important for accurate integer overflow detection [13]. EVM-
PATCH is a flexible framework that can integrate many static
analysis tools for detecting vulnerabilities and can leverage
analysis tool improvements with minimal effort. Last and
most importantly, EVMPATCH automates the whole life-
cycle of deploying and managing an upgradable contract,
while SMARTSHIELD is designed to harden a contract pre-
deployment. With EVMPATCH, a smart contract developer
can also patch vulnerabilities that are discovered after deploy-
ment of the contract.
The Ethereum community explored several design patterns
to allow upgradable smart contracts [11, 41, 45, 46] with man-
ual migration to a new contract and the proxy pattern being the
most popular (see § 2). The ZeppelinOS [46] framework sup-
ports upgradable contracts by implementing the delegatecall-
proxy pattern. However, developers have to manually ensure
compatibility of the legacy and patched contract on the Solid-
ity level. This can be achieved using static analysis tools that
perform “upgradeability” checks (e.g., Slither [35] checks
for a compatible storage layout), which relies on accurate
knowledge of compiler behavior with respect to storage allo-
cations. On the other hand, EVMPATCH combines existing
analysis tools and provides an automatic method to patch de-
tected vulnerabilities while keeping storage layout consistent
by design.
7 Conclusion
Updating erroneous smart contracts constitutes one of the
major challenges in the field of blockchain technologies. The
recent past has shown that attackers are fast in successfully
abusing smart contract errors due to the natural design of
the underlying technology: always online and available, one
common and simple computing engine without any subtle
software and configuration dependencies, and (often) high
amount of cryptocurrency at disposal. While many propos-
als have introduced frameworks to aid developers in finding
bugs, it remains open how developers and the community can
quickly and automatically react to vulnerabilities on already
deployed contracts. In this work, we developed a framework
that supports automated and instant patching of smart contract
errors based on bytecode rewriting. In terms of evaluation, we
were able to demonstrate that real-world vulnerable contracts
can be successfully patched without violating the functional
correctness of the smart contract. Our developer study shows
that an automated patching approach greatly reduces the time
required for patching smart contracts and that our implemen-
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tation, EVMPATCH, can be practically integrated into a smart
contract developers workflow. We believe that automated
patching will increase the trustworthiness and acceptance of
smart contracts as it allows developers to quickly react on
reported vulnerabilities.
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A Rewriter Example
Consider Figure 7 which depicts an excerpt of a typical
control-flow graph when Solidity generates code utilizing
internal function calls. There are two callers of the internal
function, named A and B. Each caller pushes a constant re-
turn address onto the stack: A pushes the return address X; B
the constant Y. These constants are addresses of basic blocks,
where execution resumes once the internal function completes.
In this example, both callers push the address of the first basic
block of the internal function, dubbed F, onto the stack and
utilize the jump instruction to call the internal function.
To emulate the return, an indirect jump instruction is lever-
aged at the end of the internal function, where the target
address is taken from the stack. Depending on the calling
context, the final jump of the internal function will either
jump back into A or B. Note that, for this example, the sur-
rounding basic block does not contain any corresponding push
instruction of the jump target. Instead, the respective push
instruction issued at the call site has loaded the return address
on the stack. Hence, data-flow analysis is needed to determine
push instructions that are leveraged for function returns.
B Checked Add Example
This sections discusses an example for an original and patched
version of the same bytecode, as produced by our bytecode
rewriter. Figure 8 shows the original target contract, which
simply adds two constant numbers and then stops execution.
In this case the ADD instruction at address 0x04 will be re-
placed with a checked addition routine. Figure 9 shows the
linear disassembly of the patched code and Figure 10 shows
the control-flow graph (CFG) of the rewritten code. The orig-
inal basic block at address 0x00 has been replaced with a
trampoline in the patched code. The trampoline immediately
jumps to the patched copy of the original basic block at ad-
dress 0x07. Here, the checked addition patch template has
replaced the original ADD instruction. Note that the rewriter
not only modified the original basic block, but also introduced
additional basic blocks and edges into the control-flow graph.
The inserted trampoline code and the jump-back to the orig-
inal code amount to 23 additional gas used by the contract.
This is the overhead introduced by the bytecode rewriter. In
this example, we apply a checked add patch template, which
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...
PUSH1 X
...
...
PUSH1 F
JUMP
F
...
PUSH1 Y
...
PUSH1 F
JUMP
...
JUMP
X Y
Internal
Function
Caller A
Caller B
Caller A
(Continued)
Caller B
(Continued)
Figure 7: A jump when calling an internal function in Solidity. The
actual jump target is a constant which is pushed several instructions
before the jump is executed. Furthermore, the jump target is typically
masked using the AND instruction. The basic block leading to the
jump must be emulated to compute the actual jump target.
1 // original code
2 0x00: PUSH1 0x1 // (gas: 3)
3 0x02: PUSH1 0x1 // (gas: 3)
4 0x04: ADD // (gas: 3)
5 0x05: JUMPDEST // (gas: 1)
6 0x06: STOP // (gas: 0)
Figure 8: Original code, which simply adds two numbers. The com-
ments show the gas utilization of the instructions.
verifies the invariant that (a+b)>= a. The checked version
of the addition requires an additional 35 gas when no overflow
is detected. This sums up to a total overhead of 58 gas.
C Detailed Analysis of False-Positives of
Osiris in Hexagon Token
The Hexagon Token contract is vulnerable to an integer over-
flow, which allows an attacker to transfer very large amounts
of ERC-20 Tokens [26]. Osiris reports two false positives,
which are caused by EVM code that is generated by the Solid-
ity compiler. Figure 11 shows the Solidity and corresponding
EVM code. In the Solidity code in the upper listing of Fig-
ure 11, we can see that the variable _value is of type unsigned
(Line 6) and the variable burnPerTransaction is also un-
1 // patched code
2 // TRAMPOLINE
3 0x00: PUSH1 0x7 // (gas: 3)
4 0x02: JUMP // (gas: 8)
5 0x03: INVALID // (gas: 0)
6 0x04: INVALID // (gas: 0)
7 // continuation of original code
8 0x05: JUMPDEST // (gas: 1)
9 0x06: STOP // (gas: 0)
10 // -------------------------------------------------------
11 // PATCHED BASIC BLOCK (called via trampoline)
12 0x07: JUMPDEST // (gas: 1)
13 0x08: PUSH1 0x1 // (gas: 3)
14 0x0a: PUSH1 0x1 // (gas: 3)
15 // CHECKED ADD
16 0x0c: DUP1 // (gas: 3)
17 0x0d: SWAP2 // (gas: 3)
18 0x0e: ADD // (gas: 3)
19 0x0f: DUP1 // (gas: 3)
20 0x10: SWAP2 // (gas: 3)
21 0x11: SWAP1 // (gas: 3)
22 0x12: LT // (gas: 3)
23 0x13: ISZERO // (gas: 3)
24 0x14: PUSH1 0x1b // (gas: 3)
25 0x16: JUMPI // (gas: 10)
26 0x17: PUSH1 0x0 // (gas: 3)
27 0x19: DUP1 // (gas: 3)
28 0x1a: REVERT // (gas: 0)
29 0x1b: JUMPDEST // (gas: 1)
30 // jump-back to original code:
31 0x1c: PUSH1 0x5 // (gas: 3)
32 0x1e: JUMP // (gas: 8)
Figure 9: Rewritten code, the first basic block is replaced with a
trampoline jumping to the patched copy of the basic block at the
end. The patched copied now performs a checked addition. The
comments show the gas utilization of the instructions.
signed (Line 1). Even though all types are unsigned types
in the addition in Line 9, the compiler generates a signed
addition. The signed addition can be seen in lines 7 to 9 in the
lower listing, where a negative signed value is pushed onto
the stack. Here, Osiris reports a possible integer overflow,
when −2 is added to the balanceOf mapping variable. When
performing signed integer additions with negative values, the
addition naturally overflows when the result moves from the
negative value range into the positive value range and vice
versa.
When patching the ADD on line 12 in the lower listing of Fig-
ure 11, with a checked addition, we introduce a false positive.
Replacing a signed addition with a checked unsigned addi-
tion will always fail if negative numbers are involved, since
they naturally trigger a overflow when switching between the
positive and negative ranges due to the two’s complement
representation. The patch tester in our pipeline marked almost
all transactions as failing, which is a strong indicator for a
failed patch.
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PUSH1 0x7
JUMP
__________
INVALID
INVALID
JUMPDEST
STOP
JUMPDEST
PUSH1 0x01
PUSH1 0x1
// CHECKED ADD
DUP1
SWAP2
ADD
DUP1
SWAP2
SWAP1
LT
ISZERO
PUSH1 0x1b
JUMPI
// No overflow
JUMPDEST
// jump back
PUSH1 0x5
JUMP
// Overflow!!!
PUSH1 0x0
DUP1
REVERT
0x00
0x05
0x07
0x170x1b
Figure 10: Control-Flow Graph of the rewritten code with the
checked addition routine included.
D Developer Study Questionnaire
Table 5 shows the full questionnaire and the correspond-
ing answers of the developers. The description of the tasks
and the document we provided alongside the question-
naire can be found on our github page: github.com/uni-due-
syssec/evmpatch-developer-study
1 uint8 public constant burnPerTransaction = 2;
2 mapping (address => uint256) public balanceOf;
3 // ...
4 function _transfer(address _from,
5 address _to,
6 uint _value) internal {
7 // ...
8 // Line 85 in the Hexagon contract
9 balanceOf[_from] -= _value + burnPerTransaction;
10 // ...
1 // ...
2 // this computes the address of balanceOf[_from] mapping
3 SHA3
4 DUP1
5 SLOAD // load balanceOf[_from]
6 PUSH1 0x1
7 NOT // ~1 == 0xffffffff...ffffffffffe == -2
8 SWAP1 // balanceOf[_from] on top
9 DUP8 // the passed parameter ‘_value‘
10 SWAP1 // stack = [ _balanceOf[_from], _value, -2, ... ]
11 SUB // x = _balanceOf[_from] - _value
12 DUP2 // stack = [-2, _balanceOf[_from] - _value, -2, ...]
13 ADD // -2 + (_balanceOf[_from] - _value)
14 // ...
Figure 11: Problematic Solidity line in the Hexagon contract (top
listing). Solidity generates the EVM code in the bottom listing.
Instead of subtracting 2 from an unsigned integer, Solidity promotes
this to an signed integer and adds −2.
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Table 5: Developer study questionnaire and answers by six developers (identified by the letters A to F).
Question Answers Scale
A B C D E F Median
Q1 Did you write Solidity code in the last two weeks? no no no no yes no (yes/no)
Q2 Have you previously worked on a production-grade
Solidity-based Ethereum contract?
yes no no no no no (yes/no)
Q3 Have you previously worked on a production-grade smart
contract on another Blockchain Platform?
no no yes no yes yes (yes/no)
Q4 How familiar are you with Blockchain technologies in
general?
6 5 7 6 6 6 6 (1 not familiar, 7 very
familiar)
Q5 How familiar are you with the Ethereum Blockchain in
particular?
6 5 4 2 6 2 4.5 (1 not familiar, 7 very
familiar)
Q6 How familiar are you with the Solidity programming
language?
6 3 2 1 5 1 2.5 (1 not familiar, 7 very
familiar)
Q7 How familiar are you with upgradable contracts in Solidity? 5 3 1 1 4 1 2 (1 not familiar, 7 very
familiar)
Task 1
T1Q1 How confident are you in the correctness of your patch to
contract 1?
5 7 7 6 7 6 6.5 (1 least confident, 7
most confident)
T1Q2 How confident are you in the correctness of your patch to
contract 2?
6 7 7 4 7 6 6.5 (1 least confident, 7
most confident)
T1Q3 How confident are you in the correctness of your patch to
contract 3?
3 5 6 5 2 4 4.5 (1 least confident, 7
most confident)
T1Q4 How much time did you need to patch all three contracts? 78 35 40 40 55 63 47.5 (Time in Minutes)
Task 2
T2Q1 Have you previously used the delegatecall-proxy pattern in a
Solidity contract?
no no no no no no (yes/no)
T2Q2 Have you previously used a different pattern to make a
Solidity contract upgradable?
no no no no no no (yes/no)
T2Q3 Have you previously used a different upgradable smart
contract?
no no no no no no (yes/no)
T2Q4 How confident are you in the correctness of your conversion? 5 3 1 1 5 2 2.5 (1 least confident, 7
most confident)
T2Q5 How difficult was the manual conversion? 4 5 5 6 4 6 5 (1 easy, 7 most
difficult)
T2Q6 How difficult was the conversion using the evmpatch tool? 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (1 easy, 7 most
difficult)
T2Q8 How much time did you need to convert the contract to an
upgradable contract (Step 1)?
110 80 45 90 40 33 62.5 (Time in Minutes)
T2Q8 How much time did you need to convert the contract using
EVMPatch (Step 2)?
3 1 1 2 3 1 1.5 (Time in Minutes)
Task 3
T3Q1 How confident are you in the correctness of your patch? 6 7 7 7 7 6 7 (1 least confident, 7
most confident)
T3Q2 How difficult was the conversion using the EVMPatch tool? 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 (1 easy, 7 most
difficult)
T3Q3 How much time did you need to create and deploy the patch
using EVMPatch?
15 2 5 2 6 3 4 (Time in Minutes)
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